Why Bangladesh is Particularly Vulnerable

Information warfare is not just a game for powerful states. It is essentially a process where a party covertly manipulates information to force people into making decisions contrary to their own interests. In a country like Bangladesh having over 50 million social media users, limited information literacy, and intense political polarization. So, the  ground for this war is highly fertile.

An analysis by the Global Policy Journal reveals that between August and December 2024, at least 13 Indian media outlets published false reports regarding Bangladesh. Republic Bangla alone broadcasted five baseless rumors. A report by The Daily Star highlights that in the first half of 2025, the volume of fake news increased by 30 percent, and disinformation targeting the military surged by 78 percent.

How Information Warfare Works and Why We Are Falling Behind

Modern information warfare is not just about spreading fake news. Research by CSIS states that the process of influencing public opinion and government decisions by creating debate and division on platforms like Facebook, TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram has now become an integral part of modern conflict. According to an analysis by Prothom Alo, in September 2025 alone, 329 documented pieces of false information were spread in just one month; of these, 70 percent were political, and AI-generated content was used in 18 cases.

The problem is not merely technological. Inadequate cyber units, a lack of cross-platform information coordination, and the politicization of media regulation played a huge role in creating a fertile ground for the spread if disinformation.

There is Much to Learn from the World

Bangladesh is not alone in this crisis. However, some countries have shown genuine success in this fight and their experiences can show us the way.

Finland’s story is the brightest. This country stands firm despite being on the frontlines of information warfare. When foreign accounts began interfering in Finnish politics in 2016, the government quickly made a decision to build citizens’ capacity to identify them. Information literacy was integrated into the national curriculum from kindergarten to university. Students began learning how statistics can be used to lie, how images are manipulated, and how to verify news sources. Research by CNN and DISA indicates that through this method, Finland has topped Europe’s media literacy index for seven consecutive years.

Taiwan’s experience is equally relevant. It has built a multi-layered civil defense system. In 2017, the government, civil society, and the tech community jointly launched a crowdsourced fact-checking platform called “Cofacts” where anyone can submit suspicious information, and volunteers verify it. Research by Cornell University has shown that in many cases, this platform responds even faster than professional fact-checkers. The core strength of Taiwan’s model is that it is not government-run — citizens are its driving force.

Ukraine’s experience also needs to be discussed. It has been subjected to a massive disinformation campaign during its war with Russia. The Ukrainian authority’s strategy was to decentralize communication alongside government messaging, millions of ordinary citizens shared their real experiences through digital media to garner global support.

A common truth emerges from the examples of these three countries that  it is not just the government’s response, but society’s overall resilience that serves as the true shield in an information war.

What Should a National Information Warfare Strategy Look Like?

This issue is not solely the job of the government’s digital department. It is a part of national security. An effective strategy requires four pillars.

First, institutional leadership. The RAND Corporation has long argued that a central coordinating agency is essential to counter information warfare which will bridge the gap between various government ministries, law enforcement agencies, civil society, and the private tech sector. The severe lack of this coordination in Bangladesh remains glaring.

Second, technological capability. Developing systems for Deepfake detection, AI-generated content analysis, and real-time monitoring is no longer a luxury; it is a necessity. Finland already has systems in place to identify fake accounts using algorithms and remove them in coordination with social media platforms. Bangladesh must walk down that same path.

Third, information literacy. Finland has taught us that the most effective defense starts in the classroom. True resistance is only possible when regulatory policies, citizen-led counter-narrative campaigns, and educational media literacy programs work together. Critical information skills must be developed from school curricula all the way up to universities.

Fourth, international cooperation. Information warfare respects no borders. Taiwan has shown that building direct partnerships with platforms like Meta makes it possible to rapidly label and restrict disinformation. Information cooperation agreements within the frameworks of ASEAN, OIC, and the UN could open up similar opportunities for Bangladesh.

Beyond Strategy: The Moral Boundaries

A warning is essential here. If an information warfare strategy becomes a tool for state censorship, it will exacerbate the disease rather than cure it. This is the core secret of Taiwan’s success — there, civil society, not the government, is the primary warrior in the information war. True information security is built upon the foundation of free journalism, independent fact-checking institutions, and a strong role for civil society not on absolute state control.

Independent fact-checking organizations like Dismislab and Rumor Scanner are fighting most earnestly in this arena in Bangladesh. The state should stand by them, not suppress them.

Falling behind in the information war means more than just the spread of a few fake news stories. It means the distortion of electoral verdicts, the collapse of trust in the military and state institutions, the incitement of communal violence, and leaving national sovereignty defenseless against external forces.

e aspect of the storm that swept through Bangladesh’s political landscape in July and August 2024 has not yet received adequate attention. Behind the sound of gunfire, another war was being waged which was a war of words, images, videos, and algorithms. According to Rumor Scanner, incidents of misinformation increased by 52 percent throughout 2024 compared to the previous year, reaching nearly three thousand. An old video from Pakistan was circulated as an incident in Bangladesh; an AI-generated letter fanned the flames of emotion; and communal tensions were stoked using year-old photos. This is not an isolated incident — it is a well-coordinated information war.

In this reality, there is no longer time to sit in silence.

Why Bangladesh is Particularly Vulnerable

Information warfare is not just a game for powerful states. It is essentially a process where a party covertly manipulates information to force people into making decisions contrary to their own interests. In a country like Bangladesh having over 50 million social media users, limited information literacy, and intense political polarization. So, the  ground for this war is highly fertile.

An analysis by the Global Policy Journal reveals that between August and December 2024, at least 13 Indian media outlets published false reports regarding Bangladesh. Republic Bangla alone broadcasted five baseless rumors. A report by The Daily Star highlights that in the first half of 2025, the volume of fake news increased by 30 percent, and disinformation targeting the military surged by 78 percent.

How Information Warfare Works and Why We Are Falling Behind

Modern information warfare is not just about spreading fake news. Research by CSIS states that the process of influencing public opinion and government decisions by creating debate and division on platforms like Facebook, TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram has now become an integral part of modern conflict. According to an analysis by Prothom Alo, in September 2025 alone, 329 documented pieces of false information were spread in just one month; of these, 70 percent were political, and AI-generated content was used in 18 cases.

The problem is not merely technological. Inadequate cyber units, a lack of cross-platform information coordination, and the politicization of media regulation played a huge role in creating a fertile ground for the spread if disinformation.

There is Much to Learn from the World

Bangladesh is not alone in this crisis. However, some countries have shown genuine success in this fight and their experiences can show us the way.

Finland’s story is the brightest. This country stands firm despite being on the frontlines of information warfare. When foreign accounts began interfering in Finnish politics in 2016, the government quickly made a decision to build citizens’ capacity to identify them. Information literacy was integrated into the national curriculum from kindergarten to university. Students began learning how statistics can be used to lie, how images are manipulated, and how to verify news sources. Research by CNN and DISA indicates that through this method, Finland has topped Europe’s media literacy index for seven consecutive years.

Taiwan’s experience is equally relevant. It has built a multi-layered civil defense system. In 2017, the government, civil society, and the tech community jointly launched a crowdsourced fact-checking platform called “Cofacts” where anyone can submit suspicious information, and volunteers verify it. Research by Cornell University has shown that in many cases, this platform responds even faster than professional fact-checkers. The core strength of Taiwan’s model is that it is not government-run — citizens are its driving force.

Ukraine’s experience also needs to be discussed. It has been subjected to a massive disinformation campaign during its war with Russia. The Ukrainian authority’s strategy was to decentralize communication alongside government messaging, millions of ordinary citizens shared their real experiences through digital media to garner global support.

A common truth emerges from the examples of these three countries that  it is not just the government’s response, but society’s overall resilience that serves as the true shield in an information war.

What Should a National Information Warfare Strategy Look Like?

This issue is not solely the job of the government’s digital department. It is a part of national security. An effective strategy requires four pillars.

First, institutional leadership. The RAND Corporation has long argued that a central coordinating agency is essential to counter information warfare which will bridge the gap between various government ministries, law enforcement agencies, civil society, and the private tech sector. The severe lack of this coordination in Bangladesh remains glaring.

Second, technological capability. Developing systems for Deepfake detection, AI-generated content analysis, and real-time monitoring is no longer a luxury; it is a necessity. Finland already has systems in place to identify fake accounts using algorithms and remove them in coordination with social media platforms. Bangladesh must walk down that same path.

Third, information literacy. Finland has taught us that the most effective defense starts in the classroom. True resistance is only possible when regulatory policies, citizen-led counter-narrative campaigns, and educational media literacy programs work together. Critical information skills must be developed from school curricula all the way up to universities.

Fourth, international cooperation. Information warfare respects no borders. Taiwan has shown that building direct partnerships with platforms like Meta makes it possible to rapidly label and restrict disinformation. Information cooperation agreements within the frameworks of ASEAN, OIC, and the UN could open up similar opportunities for Bangladesh.

Beyond Strategy: The Moral Boundaries

A warning is essential here. If an information warfare strategy becomes a tool for state censorship, it will exacerbate the disease rather than cure it. This is the core secret of Taiwan’s success — there, civil society, not the government, is the primary warrior in the information war. True information security is built upon the foundation of free journalism, independent fact-checking institutions, and a strong role for civil society not on absolute state control.

Independent fact-checking organizations like Dismislab and Rumor Scanner are fighting most earnestly in this arena in Bangladesh. The state should stand by them, not suppress them.

Falling behind in the information war means more than just the spread of a few fake news stories. It means the distortion of electoral verdicts, the collapse of trust in the military and state institutions, the incitement of communal violence, and leaving national sovereignty defenseless against external forces.